A review of Chinese procurement records has revealed that the Chinese military has actively sought Nvidia’s advanced artificial intelligence chips since at least 2019, raising new concerns about the effectiveness of U.S. export controls, tells The New York Times article (full article available to subscribers). The findings, compiled by Wirescreen, a platform that tracks Chinese corporate and government activity, challenge claims that China’s military does not rely on Nvidia technology.
The analysis examined 3,800 procurement records related to high-performance computing and identified more than 500 instances in which units of the People’s Liberation Army requested Nvidia chips by name or technical specification. The requests spanned nearly every branch of the military, including organizations involved in nuclear simulations, cyberwarfare, surveillance, and military planning. Although the records document purchase attempts and supplier agreements rather than confirmed deliveries, they suggest sustained efforts to obtain American AI technology despite growing restrictions.
The report arrives as Washington debates future semiconductor export policies. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has argued that restricting sales to China risks ceding the world’s largest semiconductor market to domestic competitors while doing little to impede China’s technological progress. Nvidia maintains that the Chinese military is not dependent on a relatively small number of its chips and points to the growing capabilities of domestic suppliers, particularly Huawei.
At the same time, lawmakers concerned about national security view the procurement data as evidence that advanced U.S. technology could strengthen China’s military capabilities. Proposed legislation, including the AI OVERWATCH Act, would tighten oversight of chip exports and give Congress a greater role in approving foreign sales.
The records also show how Chinese military organizations adapted to export controls. Procurement entities increasingly relied on intermediaries, shell companies, and overseas channels to obscure purchases. Some research institutes gained access to advanced computing power by renting capacity from commercial data centers rather than purchasing hardware directly.
The findings highlight a broader reality of the global semiconductor competition. While export controls have slowed China’s access to advanced technology and introduced operational challenges, they have also accelerated Beijing’s efforts to develop domestic alternatives. As Huawei and other Chinese firms expand their chip capabilities, policymakers continue to debate whether technology restrictions are effectively protecting U.S. advantages or inadvertently encouraging greater Chinese self-sufficiency in AI and semiconductor development.