In this article from IEEE Spectrum, the author recounts the short-lived era when Apple opened up its software ecosystem to third-party hardware makers. Between early 1995 and late 1997, external companies such as Power Computing Corporation, UMAX Technologies, and Motorola Inc. (among others) licensed Apple’s Mac OS and built so-called Mac “clones.”
The rationale: Apple faced a PC market dominated by open architectures, and hoped that by licensing its software it could gain market share and reduce hardware costs. For consumers, this meant something new: legitimate Macintosh-compatible hardware alternatives—potentially lower cost, more varied. But the strategy quickly undermined Apple’s own business. Some clone makers undercut Apple’s pricing, cannibalized sales of Apple’s hardware, and exposed Apple to competition in a segment where it previously controlled both hardware and software.
Compounding the issue: Apple itself was offering many device variants and struggling with its own hardware design discipline. The clone era exposed weaknesses in Apple’s product line and emphasized the Mac’s software strength rather than its hardware uniqueness. Within just a few years, upon the return of Steve Jobs, Apple pulled the plug: it discontinued clone licensing, bought out Power Computing’s clone business, and reasserted strict hardware control.
The article positions the clone episode as a cautionary chapter: a bold attempt at expansion that collided with Apple’s own vertically integrated DNA. While clones offered choice and potential growth, they also eroded Apple’s margin, market position, and differentiated value. By the late 1990s, the clone market collapsed, leaving the Mac ecosystem once again under Apple’s exclusive control.
The clone era illustrates how hardware and software alignment matters, and how loosening control without matching business strategy can unravel even iconic platforms.